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PERINATAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV:
CAUSE FOR THE RESURRECTION OF
WRONGFUL LIFE
JOHN

F.

HERNANDEZ*

Although HIV infection 1 continues to grow at a rapid pace, 2 behavior modification can, by and large, constrain the spread of HIV.
Some modifications, such as encouraging sexual abstinence and
utilizing safer sex practices, as well as scientific changes such as
screening blood and blood products for HIV, are not too difficult to
implement. 3 Other modifications which would also act to reduce
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law,
Miami, Florida.
1. I will use the phrase "HIV-positive" or "HIV" to designate individuals
infected with the human immunodeficiency virus. At times, the term "AIDS"
will be used. Since HIV-related illnesses run a broad spectrum of opportunistic
infections and diseases, the term "AIDS" may be somewhat misleading.
2. The New Franknessin AIDS Ads, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1994, at A18.
Nationwide, the deadly AIDS virus is taking more than 90 lives a day. The
national statistics help tell the tale: nearly 400,000 reported AIDS cases
since the epidemic started a decade ago, 202,000 AIDS related deaths, and
now from nowhere in the early 1980s, AIDS is ranked as the third-leading
killer of Americans between 25 and 44 years old.
Id.
In 1992, HIV-related illnesses became the leading cause of death in men 25
to 44 years old in the United States. Id. 1992 estimates reveal that 33,590
people died from HIV-related illnesses in the United States. Update: Mortality
Attributable to HIV Infection Among PersonsAged 25-44 Years-United States,
1991 and 1992, 270 JAMA 2672, 2672 (1993) (citing statistics from the United
States Centers for Disease Control). Approximately 12 million individuals
worldwide are HIV-positive. D'Arcy Jenish, A Deadly Debate, MACLEAN'S, Apr.
1992, at 58 (quoting statistics from World Health Organization). By the year
2000, the World Health Organization predicts this figure will approach 40 million individuals. Id.
3. Many of these behavior modifications and other efforts that would help
control the spread of HIV will not be immediately effective on a wide scale. The
efforts to educate and inform must be aggressive and on-going. In the past,
early education, as well as the dissemination of frank and often graphic information to homosexual men in the United States, helped control the spread of
HIV in that population. Cynthia G. Wagner, AIDS and the Year 2000: The
World's Struggle Against AIDS, FrruRiST, May-June 1989, at 17.
The fear of offending certain groups has impeded the dissemination of relevant information to those in danger of contracting or spreading HIV. Jeffrey
McCullough, The Nation's Changing Blood Supply System, 269 JAMA 2239,
2243 (1993). In addition, some groups also viewed AIDS as a political vehicle
and cloaked the medical epidemic in terms of morality and God's will. MICHAEL
L. CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES & MATERIALS 180 (1989). However, these actions
only made the dissemination of scientifically based information more difficult.
John Corry, In God They Trust, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1993, at 42. For a discussion of the politics of AIDS, see CLOSEN, supra, at 177-262.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:393

the spread of HIV are more difficult and expensive to maintain.
These include problems associated with devising methods to effectively counsel intravenous drug users to change their behavior in
order to avoid the possibility of transmitting HIV by sharing hypo4
dermic needles.
Adults and adolescents have been the focus of these behavior
modifications and educational efforts and these changes have
yielded varying degrees of success. However, HIV-positive newborns create a troublesome by-product of the HIV pandemic since
these modifications are minimally effective in curtailing the
number of infants born HIV-positive. Although behavior modification may affect the number of adults or adolescents that become
HIV-infected, the HIV status of a newborn is directly related to the
HIV status of the mother. Reducing the potential number of HIVpositive mothers would, necessarily, reduce the number of HIV-positive newborns. However, regarding the population of HIV-positive
pregnant women at any point in time, efforts to educate and modify
their behavior are too late. Thus, the HIV status of the child is left
largely to fate.
The risk of perinatal transmission of HIV, from mother to
child, has not been conclusively determined. Studies have suggested the risk of perinatal transmission ranges from seven percent
to seventy one percent of all births by HIV-positive women. 5 HIVpositive newborns, perhaps the most "innocent"6 of all HIV-positive
Today, testing blood and insuring the safety of blood products is a relatively
easy and inexpensive act. However, there has been a great deal of criticism
surrounding the manner in which the blood industry dealt with testing at a
time when scientists first determined the nation's blood supply could be a
means of transmitting HIV. RANDY SHILTs, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 307-08
(1987); see Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988); see
also Kozup v. Georgetown, 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D. D.C. 1987) (describing the
problems of the blood products industry in detecting HV).
4. Dick Thompson, Getting to the Point in New Haven, TIME, May 25, 1992,
at 55, 55 ("Today one-third of the nation's AIDS cases originate from IV drug
use. More specifically, 71% of all females with AIDS are linked directly or indirectly to IV drug use, as are 70% of all pediatric AIDS cases."). Some have
proposed controversial remedies such as dispensing needles to intravenous
drug users, decriminalizing possession of hypodermic needles and distributing
condoms to inmates in prisons. Id. at 56. It is worth noting that aggressive
outreach and education programs can reach even the vast population of prison

inmates.

HANDBOOK ON THE RISK OF

AIDS 519-50 (1993).

5. Michael E. St. Louis et al., Risk for PerinatalHIV-1 TransmissionAccording to Maternal Immunologic, Virologic, and PlacentalFactors, 269 JAMA
2853, 2853 (1993). Another recent study found an HIV infection rate of 23.9%.
Clara Gambino et al., Mother-to-Child Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1: Risk of Infection and Correlatesof Transmission, 90
PEDIATRICS

369 (1992).

6. The author does not intend for the word "innocent" to be judgmental.
Rather, it merely connotes that an HIV-positive newborn has not engaged in
any act or omission that led to her infection. The newborn was an innocent
bystander. Of course, the same could be said of persons that have become HIVpositive by receiving infected blood transfusions or blood products.
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individuals, generally live short, tortured7 lives necessitating expensive and intrusive medical intervention.
Although a few HIV-positive children may "seroconvert,"8
many will not. 9 The mothers of these infants are often, or will become, quite debilitated from HIV-related illnesses and may be unable to care for these children. Medical care and maintenance of
these children during their short lives will fall upon already seriously overburdened social institutions such as community hospitals
and public service organizations. 10
As a result of the need to reduce the incidence of HIV-positive
newborns, this author proposes what at first glance may seem radical and reactionary: a child born HIV-positive should be able to
maintain a tort cause of action for "wrongful life" when a physician
or medical professional has failed to test and disclose to the pregnant mother that she is HIV-positive, as well as failing to disclose
the ramifications of an HIV-positive mother giving birth. Although
this author does not propose mandatory abortion, physicians should
have a duty to test for HIV and to disclose relevant HIV information to pregnant mothers."
7. Although the actual number of HIV-positive children is still small in
comparison to the number of adults with HIV, HIV is growing more rapidly
among children than in adult populations. Richard Conviser et al., Pediatric
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Hospitalizationsin New Jersey, 87 PEDIATRICs

642 (1991).

8. Seroconverting defines the process where an individual initially tests
HIV-positive and subsequently tests HIV-negative.
9. Some percentage of infants testing positive for HIV may in fact be false
positive. False positive defines a test result that detects antibodies from the
mother's system that are also present in the infant. See Conviser, supra note 7,
at 642. If the infant is not truly HIV-positive, she will later test negative. Id.
Generally, an infant that seroconverts to HIV-negative is free of the virus and
should suffer no ill effects in the future. Id. It may take up to 15 months for an
infant to seroconvert to HIV-negative. Id.
10. See Conviser, supra note 7, at 642. "Some HIV-infected infants have
been abandoned at hospitals to become 'boarder babies' by parents unable or
unwilling to care for them. For both medical and social reasons, then, children
with AIDS are believed to utilize hospital resources differently than adults with
AIDS." Id. HIV affects children differently than the way in which it affects
adults. James D. Hegarty et al., The Medical Care Costs of Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Infected Children in Harlem, 260 JAMA 1901 (1988).
"Boarder babies" may not need immediate medical care even though they are
HIV-infected. Id. at 1902. However, they have no other place to go. Id.
Estimates reveal that from 72,000 to 125,000 children could be orphaned
by the year 2000 if the epidemic spreads at its current rate. David Michaels &
Carol Levine, Estimates of the Number of Motherless Youth Orphaned by AIDS
in the United States, 268 JAMA 3456, 3458 (1992).
The problem of "boarder babies" is not necessarily limited to large urban
centers. Even as early as 1990, a study found that 1 of every 70 women giving
birth in New Haven, Connecticut was HIV-infected. Christine Russell, Not
One, But Several Epidemics: Children, WASH. POST, June 19, 1990, at z18.
11. Near the publication date of this Article, the Centers for Disease Control released a ground breaking study indicating that the perinatal transmission rate of HIV was dramatically reduced in HIV-positive pregnant women
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The creation of a wrongful life cause of action imposes a duty of
accountability upon physicians to the pregnant women they treat.
A wrongful life cause of action makes it possible to impose an industry-wide standard that would diminish the transmission of HIV to
newborns. In addition, permitting actions for wrongful life would
provide an effective means of generating the necessary funds to
treat HIV-infected newborns in the event a physician fails to comply with the minimum standard.
An infant plaintiff should be able to proceed on a tort cause of
action when his or her birth could have been avoided had a physician engaged in adequate counseling and testing during the pregnancy of the mother. Liability may also exist where a laboratory or
other testing facility negligently ran a test and failed to correctly
detect that a pregnant woman was HIV-positive. However, these
tort actions may not only be legally difficult to maintain given the
current state of tort law, but they also present serious ethical and
moral concerns.
A major assumption underlying the arguments set forth in this
Article is that a pregnant woman needs to know her HIV status;
she has an obligation to protect her potential child from acquiring
HIV. 12 A pregnant woman should not be permitted to keep her
head buried in the sand. Her willful ignorance can have an immediate impact on her child. 13 Nevertheless, some argue a woman
treated with AZT. Lawrence K. Altman, Major Finding, Drug Limits H.LV.
Infection in Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Drug Lim-

its HIV]. In fact, this study lends even stronger support for establishing the
HIV testing of pregnant women as a minimum standard for health care providers. Adequate testing, counseling and drug therapy could significantly reduce
the number of HIV-infected newborns. Id.
12. Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to
the Individuals Tested: A Matter of PersonalChoice Neglected, 22 LoY. U. CHI.

L.J. 445 (1991). Actually, the physician would have the obligation to test and
counsel the mother. This obligation would then run to the potential child.
However, the physician would not be able to delegate his duty to the woman.
The reason is that the woman should not act as an obstacle to the physician by
preventing him from executing his duty to test and counsel the mother. Thus,
although a woman may elect not to undergo HIV testing and normally, therefore, assume the risks of misdiagnosis or mistreatment, the potential mother

cannot "assume the risk" of HIV transmission to the newborn.
13. Although it may appear sexist and gender-biased, there would not necessarily be any parallel responsibility on potential fathers since a man cannot
bear children and intimately affect the HIV status of his unborn child. There
could be an argument that all persons who engage in sexual activity have an
obligation to know and disclose their HIV-status. Cf Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr.
564, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a person had an obligation to warn
potential sexual partners that he had contracted genital herpes in the past); see
also Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)

(ruling that the fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection of a venereal

disease vitiated a person's consent to sexual intercourse).
However, an argument could be made that both sexual partners have a
corresponding obligation to avoid infection, and their failure to do so would indicate they each "assumed the risk" of contracting HIV. But see Donald H.J. Her-
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should have complete discretion as to whether to inform herself of
her HIV status by taking the appropriate tests. 14 The decision of a
pregnant woman to be informed affects not only herself, but also
the potential child. Therefore a physician has a duty to inform the
woman of a potential risk just as the physician would with regard
to any other obvious or readily ascertainable health concern.
A second assumption made in this Article is that once a pregnant woman arms herself with knowledge of her HIV status, she
should make reasoned decisions regarding whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 15 Presumably, the testing should be done
early enough in the pregnancy so the woman could freely exercise
her right to an abortion as determined in Roe v. Wade. 16 The woman must consider the possibility that her infant may be born HIVpositive. She must also weigh the likelihood of survival for both the
infant and herself. A woman must also consider her own moral and
ethical beliefs in determining whether to abort her fetus. 17 Finally,
mann, Liability Related to Diagnosisand Transmissionof AIDS, 15 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 36 (1987) (arguing assumption of risk would not apply since a

defendant would have to demonstrate the plaintiffs subjective knowledge of the
defendant's HIV and would not be able to rely on common community knowledge of the possibility of contracting HIV through intercourse). Also, even if
assumption of risk was not a complete defense, there could be determinations
made with regard to the comparative negligence of the plaintiff which would
reduce the defendant's liability. Nonetheless, the defense of assumption of risk
would not be applicable to an HIV-positive newborn.
14. At times, even persons displaying classical symptoms of AIDS may refuse testing for HIV. The harm that may result from their willful ignorance will
fall almost exclusively on the patient. In the event an individual spreads the
HIV infection to a sexual partner, the partner may have a cause of action
against such a willfully ignorant person. Willful ignorance implies that a person cannot escape liability when a reasonable person would have made an inquiry. See Glover v. Hardeman County Highway Dep't, 713 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985); cf C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that based upon information available to the public since 1985 the defendant
would not have reason to know of his HIV status). The reason for such an
action is that the willful ignorance of the HIV-positive mother would have intimately affected the health of her HIV-positive newborn. Consequently, tort law
should serve as an impetus to overcome the willful ignorance, at least in the
situation of an HIV-positive mother.
15. The reader should only construe this proposition to mean that the woman has been advised of the problems associated with bearing an HIV-positive
child. Although this proposition comes close to imposing mandatory abortion
for a woman once her physician notifies her that she is HIV-positive, this author is not prepared to carry this argument to that extreme. The imposition of
mandatory abortion raises issues of personal autonomy and privacy that are
beyond the scope of this paper.
The wrongful life cause of action proposed in this essay addresses only actions based on some form of professional malpractice. This author is not prepared to extend the reach of the wrongful life cause of action by providing the
HIV-positive newborn with an action against his mother for her failure to abort.
16. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
17. Presumably, until a physician tests a woman for HIV, she may have
had no knowledge that she is HIV-positive. Thus, after the tests are taken, the
woman faces a panoply of critical psychological and social issues. However, the
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a woman may choose to incur the risk of having the child that may
be minimized by drug therapies."'
In any event, regardless of the position of the woman on abortion, a treating physician must advise her of her HIV status in order to allow her to make a reasoned decision. If she then elects to
adhere to her prior position in opposition to abortion, she will then
at least proceed with the pregnancy having received more meaningful information. In addition, she will have been given a clear opportunity to terminate her pregnancy and eliminate the birth of an
HIV-positive newborn. Furthermore, disclosure of this information
to the pregnant mother is also essential since there may be certain
treatments her physician could recommend to reduce the possibility
that she would give birth to an HIV-positive infant.1 9
Since this Article focuses on a wrongful life cause of action, the
physician would satisfy his duty to the fetus upon informing the
woman of her HIV status and adequately counseling the pregnant
woman. Although this perhaps seems harsh and imposes an unnecessary emotional burden on the pregnant woman as to whether or
not to abort her fetus or to begin drug therapies, 20 in the absence of
this knowledge, the woman would only consider abortion in the abstract. The woman would not be aware of potential drug therapies
or other concerns with regard to impeding transmission. Objecting
to abortion in principle and "hoping for the best," and not being informed are not sufficient given the ease of determining the HIV status of the mother and the potentially dire consequences to the
newborn.
The first obstacle that would have to be overcome would be the
creation of a wrongful life cause of action for an HIV-positive infant.
Tort law has long recognized a cause of action in medical malpractice when the negligence of a physician or laboratory leads to the
scope of the duty the physician may owe to the woman relating to these psycho-

logical and social issues is not within the purview of this essay.
For an example of a particularly troublesome fact pattern, consider Estate

of Jane Doe and John Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F. Supp. 746, 747 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993). In Estate of JaneDoe, the mother discovered she was HIV-positive
on the same day her infant died from an HIV-related illness. Id.
18. Drug Limits HIV, supra note 11.

19. Id. If the woman elects to proceed with the birth, she should also consider issues such as breast feeding. This would allow the woman to prepare
herself emotionally for the possibility of giving birth to an HIV-positive infant.
An ancillary benefit of receiving this knowledge from a physician is that the
woman may hopefully begin to deal with her own HIV-condition and its poten-

tial impact on her life and that of the child.
20. Id. Ideally, a woman could submit herself to HIV testing before the
woman actually becomes pregnant. However, this proposition may not reflect

reality since many HIV-positive women are not inclined to seek testing or counseling for a possible HIV-infection if they are merely "considering" motherhood,

particularly if they are asymptomatic. In addition, many women do not have
planned pregnancies.
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birth of a child with physical or mental disabilities. Assuming the
negligence of the physician or laboratory has led to a disability, conventional tort wisdom would dictate that the damages of the child
should be measured by comparing the condition of the child after
the negligence against the hypothetical condition of the child if the
negligence had not occurred. The difference would be the damages
suffered by the child, and some attempt would then be made to eco21
nomically quantify these damages.
Although wrongful life cases are well accepted, they are still
problematic. Theoretically, the conventional negligence tort analysis of duty, breach, causation and damages lends itself to a cause of
action for wrongful life. However, in reality each of these elements
are difficult to apply to such legal actions.
First, issues of medical malpractice by physicians or laboratories causing a disability to a newborn are often difficult to determine or prove. The "victim" in these situations is, by definition, a
disabled newborn. Accordingly, the newborn will not be able to recognize the acts or omissions which led to the disability. Likewise,
those persons closest to the victim, most likely the parents, may
also not be cognizant of the acts or omissions which caused the disability. At least initially, they may be inclined to defer to the judgment of the very person who may be liable for the malpractice.
Normally, the parents may view the disability of the child as a tragedy imposed by fate. Furthermore, the parents may even harbor
feelings of guilt, believing the disability must be the result of something they did or did not do.
Likewise, a second hurdle involves the issue of whether a potential defendant breached his duty to the newborn. 22 For example, in the context of a conventional medical malpractice action, a
physician is entitled to exercise his professional judgment. However, it does not necessarily follow that the physician deviated from
the applicable standard of care merely because his judgment was
incorrect. However, this may be less true in a setting involving erroneous lab results since those situations should call for less judg21. Juries have a great deal of discretion in awarding noneconomic damages in these types of cases. However, despite the difficulty in quantifying
noneconomic damages, juries have awarded sizeable damages. See, e.g., Scott v.
United States, 884 F.2d 1280, 1283 (9th Cir. 1989) (awarding infant who was
born with spastic quadriplegia $2 million in noneconomic damages); 1st of Am.
Bank, Mid-Michigan, N.A. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 764, 780 (E.D. Mich.

1990) (awarding a brain damaged child $2 million in general damages for pain
and suffering, disability and disfigurement).
22. One justification for disallowing actions for wrongful life is that the
physician owes no duty to the infant. The physician only owes a duty to the
mother. However, it does not appear that the absence of a duty to the infant
has been a major obstacle in infant medical malpractice cases. As a result, the
infant clearly is a foreseeable plaintiff in an action for wrongful life.
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ment on the part of a laboratory technician as well as an objective
standard for determining whether one is HIV-positive.
Nevertheless, even though a disabled newborn plaintiff may be
able to prove a physician or laboratory breached a duty to the newborn, the plaintiff must still confront the problem of proving that it
was the physician or laboratory whose breach caused the injury.
Needless to say, it may be nearly impossible to ascertain exactly
what caused the disability of the infant. A number of factors may
exist that have nothing to do with the acts or omissions of the physician or the laboratory. This is more likely to occur in situations
where there is no demonstrable link between the breach by the physician or laboratory and the resulting injury to the infant plaintiff.
The defendant would argue that even if his acts or omissions deviated from the accepted standard of care, the disability is attributable to other unrelated factors not within the control of the
defendant.
The newborn will also face other problems inherent in medical
malpractice actions. First, the plaintiff may have difficulty finding
competent medical professionals to testify against the physician or
laboratory. In addition, the plaintiff will likely have to confront the
expenses associated with medical malpractice litigation. However,
despite the obstacles faced by plaintiffs in actions for damages for
the disability of a newborn, these problems are magnified when
presented in the context of a cause of action for wrongful life.
The plaintiff in a cause of action for wrongful life alleges that
"but for" the negligence of the physician, the child would not have
been born. Wrongful life is viewed from the perspective of the newborn. A cause of action for wrongful life may arise from the negligent performance of an abortion, the misdiagnosis of a pregnancy,
the negligent performance of sterilization procedures on the parents of the newborn, or any other act or omission by the physician
or laboratory which caused the parents to believe they would not
conceive or give birth to a child, and yet, a viable child is born.
More importantly, these actions have been allowed in situations in
which an infant is born with serious disabilities as a result of the
negligence of the physician in diagnosing the condition that caused
the disability. The negligence of the physician did not cause the
disability per se. Rather, the physician simply failed to advise the
mother of the condition that caused the disability. As a result, the
mother did not have the opportunity to consider whether to abort
her fetus that would likely have a serious disability.
A parallel cause of action to wrongful life is that of wrongful
birth which focuses on the unexpected conception or birth of a child.
Under a wrongful birth theory of liability, the acts or omissions are
essentially the same as an action for wrongful life. However, in an
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action for wrongful birth, a physician breaches his duty of care to
the parents rather than the newborn. Thus, the parents claim the
negligence of the physician caused them to have a child they did not
desire.
Unlike the conventional medical malpractice cause of action in
which the negligence of the physician is the direct cause of the disabling condition of the newborn, in an action for wrongful life or
wrongful birth the alleged injury is the actual presence of life. At
least in theory, an action may be brought for wrongful life or wrongful birth when the infant is born free of any disabilities. 23 However, these actions are usually brought when the infant is born with
significant disabilities. The major assumption underlying an action
for wrongful life is that the infant would have been "better off' not
to have been born as opposed to suffering the disabilities inflicted
upon him as a result of his birth. The critical assumption underlying an action for wrongful birth is that the parents would have been
"better off" not having had a child than having a child with the disabilities suffered by the infant.
This Article presents no determination as to whether the "theoretical" wrongful life cause of action, in which there is no disability
to the newborn, is a viable tort cause of action. The reason for setting aside any present evaluation of the propriety of this "theoretical" cause of action is that, with regard to an infant born with HIV
that does not seroconvert, the infant has clearly suffered a sufficient disability. In addition, this author makes no assertions regarding other disabling conditions, such as genetic abnormalities,
that may serve as the basis for a wrongful life cause of action as
24
they are outside the scope of this Article.
The following hypothetical scenarios illustrate the difference
between traditional medical malpractice actions involving an infant
plaintiff and an action based upon wrongful life. The first example
illustrates conventional medical malpractice leading to a disabling
23. Some courts have named these actions "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy." See, e.g., Zehr v. Haugen, 855 P.2d 1127, 1128 (Or. Ct. App.
1993). In these actions, conception itself gives rise to the cause of action. Id.
Thus, the fact that a child is born free of disabilities is not particularly relevant
to the "injury." See Gallagher v. Duke, 852 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that an action for wrongful conception could stand where the negligence of
the physician caused the parents to give birth to a child with defects).
For a collection of cases in which juries awarded parents damages for unwanted, yet healthy children, see George C. Christie & James E. Meeks, CASES
& MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF TORTS 799-800 (2d ed. 1990).
24. Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1991). Professor Kelly argues that an action for wrongful
life should exist when a physician fails to provide adequate genetic counseling
to the parents. Id. at 511. Although this author concurs in the argument advanced by Professor Kelly, the failure to perform an appropriate HIV test or to
properly counsel a woman presents an even more compelling argument for the
creation of a wrongful life cause of action.
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injury to the newborn. Assume a physician negligently injects a
mother with a drug during birth that denies a substantial amount
of oxygen to the brain of the child during the birth process resulting
in brain damage. This would be a situation in which, had the physician not been negligent, the infant would have been born "normal,"
free of the defects associated with the oxygen deprivation.
Now assume a physician fails to test a pregnant woman for
HIV. If the physician had tested the woman, he would have found
she was HIV-positive. The physician would then have been able to
inform the woman that carrying the child to term presented a significant likelihood that the child would be born HIV-positive and
live a short life characterized by chronic, debilitating illnesses. Assuming the physician correctly detected the HIV status of the woman and counseled her regarding the probabilities of delivering an
HIV-positive child, the woman may have chosen to abort the fetus
rather than to give birth. However, unlike the conventional medical malpractice cause of action, the disabilities imposed upon the
newborn were not "caused" by the negligence of the physician.
Rather, the injury caused by the negligence of the physician is that
the physician did not provide the woman with the knowledge necessary to make the decision of whether or not to abort the fetus and
avoid the birth altogether. The injury to the newborn is that he is
now alive. The newborn never had the option to be born without
HIV.
The courts that have addressed these issues have had a great
deal of difficulty articulating and quantifying the injury visited
upon the newborn and the parents. Even though a physician or
laboratory may have unquestionably deviated from the applicable
standard of care, courts have been entrenched in a quagmire regarding duty and, more importantly, the resulting injury.
However, whether a physician or laboratory owed a duty to the
unborn fetus is a misdirected inquiry. In conventional medical malpractice actions involving newborns, courts have consistently
viewed the injured newborn as the "right" party even though the
acts or omissions of the physician or laboratory may have been directed solely at the mother. 25 The newborn is clearly a "foreseeable" plaintiff under this theory. Any attempt to disregard the duty
owed to the newborn is a misdirected return to the abandoned requirement of privity between tortfeasor and plaintiff.26 Thus, there
25. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
26. The more viable test is whether the infant is a "foreseeable plaintiff,"
and not whether the infant is in privity with the physician. See, e.g., Andalon v.

Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (indicating that a
father was a foreseeable plaintiff in a medical malpractice action based upon
the injuries suffered by his son due to the role of the father in the "reproductive
life of the marital couple."). The seminal case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
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is no need to resurrect the requirement of privity in the context of a
wrongful life cause of action.
The more fundamental stumbling block to application of tort
analysis to wrongful life situations is the difficulty in determining
the injury to the HIV-positive newborn. A central concern is the
difference in value to the newborn of an HIV-positive life as opposed
to not having a life at all. Is nonexistence "worth more" than existence with HIV?
Wrongful birth presents similar problems involving damages.
The injured plaintiff parents are now confronted with the costs and
responsibilities of raising and caring for a child due to the negligence of the defendant. It is clear that the presence of disabilities
may make their claim for damages more compelling since the cost of
raising the child rises significantly. However, in reality, the parents have arguably been injured by the mere presence of the newborn since the parents will incur the ordinary costs of raising and
caring for a new child. The underlying injury is the birth itself.
Courts and commentators have wrestled with the application of tort
law to wrongful life and wrongful birth actions. 2 7 However, to the
extent there appears to be a consensus forming, it appears as
though courts are not inclined to find a valid cause of action in
wrongful life. 28 The "victim" simply suffers no injury. Since the
infant has a life she would not otherwise have, she is better off than
being deprived of all life. 2 9 In fact, courts seem to support this
30
proposition even when the newborn has significant disabilities.
On the other hand, some courts have indicated a willingness to
find at least the potential for recovery in wrongful birth situations. 31 However, these courts strayed from the conventional deter162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), established that the critical inquiry in tort law is the
foreseeability of the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the "special relationship" of the physician to the newborn, as
well as the view that the newborn is a third party beneficiary of the physician's

treatment of the mother, should provide sufficient justification for a finding of
potential liability in the absence of contractual privity. See Hegyes v. Unjian
Enters. Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting circumstances
may exist where a newborn has a cause of action for negligence that occurred
before birth);.see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (imposing
liability on one who undertakes to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person when he fails to exercise reasonable care).
27. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630
A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 75 (N.J. 1989);
Kelly, supra note 24.
28.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 55, at 371 (5th ed. 1984).
29. Id. at n.45.
30. See Kelly, supra note 24, at 506-07.
31. See, e.g., Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993) ("Wrongful

birth cases are now widely recognized. An action exists when physicians fail to
warn prospective parents that they are at risk of conceiving or giving birth to a
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mination of tort damages. 3 2 Courts have analogized the calculation
of damages in wrongful birth actions to the method of determining
damages in medical malpractice actions with injuries to the newborn. As a result, these courts awarded damages to the parents in
order to compensate them for the costs associated with the disability of the newborn.3 3 In addition, a defendant may not offset the
amount of damages by any benefit conferred on the parents due to
the birth of a child, such as the ability to enjoy a parent-child relationship, as well as the companionship and comfort afforded by the
presence of the child. 34 Parents can experience the same pleasures
whether rearing a disabled child or one that does not suffer from a
particular affliction. Furthermore, since parenthood comes with
few guarantees, many "normal" children may also present a multitude of problems, costs and heartaches to parents.
Plaintiffs bringing actions based on theories of wrongful life
and wrongful birth have been most successful, by and large, when
physicians have failed to correctly diagnose certain conditions relevant to the fetus or the parents which cause the newborn to have a
seriously disabling condition. 35 In addition, litigation will most
likely increase under these two theories as developments in science
and technology allow physicians to discover genetic defects or even
the propensities for certain inherited debilitating illnesses.
However, the formulation of more clearly defined parameters of
liability in wrongful life and wrongful birth actions should not be
postponed merely to await further advances in genetic technology.
The looming presence and rapid spread of HIV presents an all-toocommon situation where physicians may, to some extent, detect and
child with a serious genetic disorder."); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145,
1152 (Md. 1993); Glascock v. Laserna, No. 930182, 1994 WL 2889, at *3 (Va.
Jan. 7, 1994).
32. The concept of damages in conventional tort law seeks to place the

plaintiff in the position she would otherwise have been in absent the tortious

acts of the defendant. In tort actions for wrongful birth, as well as wrongful life,

absent the tortious acts of the defendant, the infant would not have been born.
Realistically, judges and juries cannot calculate the difference in damages be-

tween life and the absence of life. Therefore, in actions for wrongful birth involving a disabled child, courts customarily award the extraordinary medical
expenses associated with the disabilities of these infants. See supra, note 31.

33. Currently, a dispute exists as to the appropriate measure of damages in

a wrongful birth actions. Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1029. Some courts apply general
principles of tort law and compensate the parents for all damages proximately

related to the negligence of the physician, such as extraordinary medical expenses of the infant, costs of caring for the disabled infant, emotional distress
suffered by the parents, and pain and suffering of the mother due to the birth
procedure. Id. Other jurisdictions limit the damages to the extraordinary medical expenses of the disabled infant. Id.
34. Courts disregard any benefit as a set off of damages. See Keel, 624 So.
2d at 1022; Glascock v. Laserna, No. 93-0182, 1994 WL 2889 (Va. Jan. 7, 1994).
35. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS

§ 55, at 372 (5th ed. 1984); see also Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th
Cir. 1981); Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
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avert the infliction of a seriously debilitating illness upon a child.
However, physicians do not have the present ability to insure that a
child will not be born with HIV. Currently, the only options available to the parents are either no child or a child born with the significant possibility of acquiring HIV.
The courts' continued preference to allow parties to proceed
with actions for wrongful birth, while generally disallowing actions
for wrongful life, is troublesome. For instance, the process of measuring damages in a wrongful birth action is just as difficult as in a
wrongful life action. 36 Thus, the difficulty in ascertaining an appropriate amount of damages in an action for wrongful life should not
justify the elimination of any possible recovery.
The courts and legislatures must reevaluate the methodology
of assessing the amount of damages recoverable in actions for
wrongful birth and wrongful life. In reevaluating the methodology,
the courts and legislatures must understand the inequities of allocating damages to the wrong party, the parents. This caveat extends, in particular, to the allocation of damages for extraordinary
medical expenses. Despite the fact that the parents' claim for damages derives from the injury visited upon the infant in an action for
wrongful birth, they would not have a fiduciary obligation to use
the damage award for the care and treatment of the disabled infant.3 7 Even though the parents may be able recover damages separately for the mental anguish associated with the responsibility of
rearing a disabled child, the actual damages awarded for the increased medical expenses seem more appropriate for the injuries
incurred by the newborn.
Although these issues illustrate the difficulty involved in fitting wrongful life and wrongful death into the parameters of conventional tort law, it defies any concept of justice to allow a
physician or laboratory to escape liability for failing to detect the
38
agent causing the disability of a child.
36. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
37. Since the basis for a wrongful birth cause of action is the perceived injury to the parents, the damages recovered would be for the benefit of the par-

ents. This results even though a significant portion of the damages awarded to
the parents may include compensation for the extraordinary medical expenses
of the infant. Technically, the infant does not recover in his or her own right.
Thus, absent some statutory obligation, the parents are not compelled to spend
any recovered damages for the benefit of the child. In addition, parents of an
HIV-positive newborn may out of necessity or choice abandon the child at the
hospital. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Also, since the mother is
HIV-positive, she may die shortly after the birth of the child.
38. Assessing damages for intangibles is always, at best, highly speculative.
For example, no objective standard exists for assessing damages for pain and
suffering, emotional distress, defamation or wrongful death. However, the inability to accurately measure these types of damages should not serve as a justification for the denial of recovery in these actions.
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Nevertheless, allowing an HIV-positive infant to pursue an action for wrongful life, and forcing a defendant to pay some damages,
furthers two primary objectives. First, it is more appropriate to
shift some of the costs incurred by the plaintiff onto the defendant.3 9 Cost-shifting serves as the foundation for actions based on a
theory of strict liability since it is appropriate in certain circumstances to shift the costs of any resulting harm to those who are in a
better position to prevent the harm .from occurring. As a result,
since actions for wrongful life are not premised upon a theory of
strict liability, an even stronger case for cost-shifting exists. Thus,
cost-shifting would provide for the well-being of the HIV-positive
infant. Although the child cannot be made "whole" or have his birth
undone, he will at least receive a more comfortable life to the fullest
extent money and technology can provide the child. As between the
innocent disabled newborn and the potentially negligent, reckless
or willful defendant, it is undoubtedly more sound for the wrongdoer to bear the costs of caring for the HIV-positive newborn.
Furthermore, by pursuing an action for wrongful life, the
source of funds would be available to the infant in his own right.
The infant would not be dependent upon the goodwill of the parents
or a third party.40 Any person administering the funds for the child
would act in a fiduciary capacity with an obligation to insure the
funds are spent in the best interests of the child. As a result, these
children would not become wards of the state and increase the burden on already financially strapped medical and social institutions
currently attempting to manage the escalating problem of children
41
born with HIV.
Imposing liability on the physician or laboratory for the child
born HIV-positive would force health care providers to adopt more
reasonable standards for testing and counseling pregnant women.
By implementing consistent testing and counseling procedures,
many otherwise HIV-positive newborns would simply not be born
39. Cost-shifting becomes of particular importance in the context of an HIVpositive newborn and a negligent physician or laboratory since the costs of caring for the HIV-positive newborn fall upon already overburdened social institutions or parents who may not be able to provide for their HIV-positive child as a
result of their own health problems. See supra note 10 for a discussion of

"boarder babies."
40. Actions to recover medical expenses of the HIV-positive newborn may
have to be brought posthumously since many newborns may die prior to the
initiation or completion of the lawsuit. Nevertheless, such actions would provide a potential source of funds to compensate the persons or entities that cared
for the HIV-positive newborn.
41. Boarder babies had an average length of stay of 339 days at care institutions. Hegarty, supra note 10, at 1903. 49.5% of these newborns received
services from care institutions that was not medically necessary. Id. Thus, the
institutions could have otherwise discharged the newborns but no one was able
or willing to take responsibility for the children. Id. Hence, the newborns simply remained in the hospital. Id.
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due to the diligent foresight and care of the physicians treating
their mothers. This is a rational goal to pursue in light of the reality that HIV-positive infants that fail to seroconvert will live short,
tortured lives at great expense. 4 2 In the absence of potential liability for health care providers, there is presently no impetus for improving the current ad hoc administration of competent methods
for testing and counseling pregnant women who are at risk of HIV.
These arguments do not delineate a complete resolution to the
problems presented by infants born HIV-positive. Situations will
still exist where children are born HIV-positive. For instance, even
though a woman may have undergone all of the appropriate tests, a
physician or laboratory may not have been able to discover her HIV
status in a time to provide the option of an abortion. 43 In addition,
a woman may simply choose not to abort her fetus. Thus, some
children would not have a party from whom to seek relief. Consequently, these children will have to rely on the ability of their families and society to generate enough support for their care.
A second benefit that would arise from the imposition of a duty
on physicians and laboratories to test pregnant women for HIV is
that it would force health care providers to further educate themselves. Hopefully, this knowledge concerning perinatal HIV would
spread not only to the patients, but also to society as a whole. The
compelled education would eliminate many current preconceptions
and falsehoods attributed to both children born HIV-positive and
persons that may unknowingly carry HIV. Physicians would no
longer be able to determine whether a woman is potentially HIVpositive merely based upon her maritial status, physical appearance, and employment. Since medical technology has advanced to
the point where a simple blood test may quickly, accurately, and
inexpensively determine whether an individual is HIV-positive, it is
archaic to rely upon these assumptions. Mandatory HIV testing for
all pregnant women that employs a reasoned and methodical analysis would displace the need for stereotypical assumptions as to who
may be in a "high risk" group for acquiring HIV. Furthermore, even
if an individual is in a "high risk" group, this fact is not relevant to
the HIV status of the newborn. 44 Allowing these preconceptions
42. In addition to the well-known symptoms of advanced HIV in adults, "recurrent episodes of bacteremia, meningitis and other bacterial infections," as
well as "chronic growth and developmental problems" also characterize pediatric HIV. Hegarty, supra note 10, at 1901.
43. As is well known, the testing mechanisms for HIV are not perfect. The
use of the current protocol entails a minute possibility of a false result. More
importantly, a "window" period exists in which a person who has been infected
with HIV will not test positive for the HIV antibodies. Steven E. Locke et al.,
Computer-based Interview for Screening Blood Donors for Risk of HIV Transmission, 268 JAMA 1301 (1992).
44. Whether a pregnant woman is in a "high risk" group is not determinative of the HIV status of the newborn. It is the actual HIV status of the woman
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and assumptions to set the standard for determining whether or
not to test a pregnant woman for HIV is analogous to permitting
blood banks to decide whether to accept blood based upon the ap45
pearance and lifestyle of an individual.
At times, courts may be unwilling to eliminate the standard of
care within an industry despite the fact that a newer standard
would be reasonable given the current state of technology. 4 6 In addition, an industry itself may not be willing to proclaim the adoption of a new standard due to the fear of "creating" liability that did
not previously exist. 4 7 This results since generally, in particular
with regard to medical malpractice, the industry standard would
determine reasonable behavior. Currently, many physicians believe it is unnecessary to provide HIV testing and counseling for
pregnant women even though the services would clearly be simple
48
and reasonable to adopt.
Despite this opposition, the acceptance of a wrongful life cause
of action for the HIV-positive newborn would clearly force health
care providers to rapidily adopt minimum standards for the provision of HIV testing to pregnant women. However, once physicians
arm themselves with the requisite knowledge and provide testing
and counseling as a regular part of their obstetric services, they will
have taken a major step towards compliance with this new standard. The imposition of a duty on physicians to commence
mandatory HIV testing for pregnant women would eliminate the
need for a case-by-case determination of whether the physician acted "reasonably" in failing to test a woman for HIV.
. Moreover, imposing mandatory testing would remove any apprehension a physician may have in suggesting an HIV test to a
pregnant woman. A physician would explain he is under a legal
that is important. She will not transmit the HIV infection to her newborn if she
is HIV-negative, despite the fact that she may be in a "high risk" group. As a

result, just as it would be patently unreasonable not to test blood donations for
the presence of HIV, it is unreasonable not to test all pregnant women for HIV.
45. See supra note 3 for a discussion of blood testing and a criticism of the
manner in which those in the blood industry dealt with the contagion.
46. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1978) (rejecting an

industry standard that required testing for glaucoma).
47. Since the medical profession can, to some extent, set its own standard of
care by adopting or refusing to adopt certain practices, it has the ability to determine its own liability. See W. PAGE KEETON

ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON

THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189 (5th ed. 1984).
48. See Drug Limits HIV,supra note 11.
Until now[,] testing for HIV infection in the United States has been recommended for those who consider themselves at risk. But testing is not
mandatory, and there is no general recommendation to test all pregnant
women. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends testing of pregnant women in areas where the prevalence of H.I.V. is high. But compliance among health officials varies.
Id.; see also HIV Infection, PregnantWomen, and Newborns: A Policy Proposal
for Information and Testing, 264 JAMA 2416 (1990).
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obligation to test the woman and that she should not infer it as a
prejudgment of her HIV status. In fact, a physician may be able to
strengthen his relationship with patients by informing women that
HIV testing is a basic requirement of good obstetrical care.
Nevertheless, the imposition of tort liability may be an imperfect tool in the effort to stem the spread of HIV. In fact, commentators surely will criticize its effectiveness. Yet, the imposition of a
new duty on physicians serves a useful societal objective, the minimization of infants born with HIV. Ultimately, the forces that will
effectively stem the spread of HIV will be more comprehensive educational programs as well as increased acceptance of behavior
49
modifications.
As for the infants born HIV-positive, the education and behavior modification of their parents may be too late. In all likelihood,
the infants will never have to be concerned with AIDS education or
methods to alter their behavior since they will not reach an age
where such methodologies will be effective.
The removal of current obstacles to actions for wrongful life
will serve the ultimate goal of tort law by providing compensation
to an injured party. Furthermore, requiring health care providers
to test and counsel all pregnant women serves as a stepping stone
to help minimize the birth of infants born with HIV and its attendant devastating effects. Society can no longer afford to fight HIV
only in research laboratories. The rapid spread of HIV has forced
society to fight it in the context of our most intimate social relationships involving sex and procreation. The devastating history of
HIV has shown that society cannot afford another puritanical approach to the issue. Subtlety may be less "offensive," but it can also
cost thousands of lives.
Education, counseling, and effective advertising may help curb
the spread of HIV from sexual contact or from the sharing of needles by intravenous drug users. Comprehensive HIV testing of blood
and blood products will also impede the spread of HIV infection
from transfusion and the use of blood products. By reducing the
number of HIV-infected people, these efforts will likewise reduce
the incidence of HIV-infected newborns.
However, when a woman is already HIV-positive, the only
means of minimizing the risk of perinatal HIV transmission is to
impose a duty on those providing health care to the woman to test
her for HIV and to provide counseling. Absent this duty, health
care providers will, at best, resort to an ad hoc methodology of testing a woman only when they "think" she may be HIV-positive.
49. See The New Frankness in AIDS Ads, supra note 2, at A18 (noting the
announcement of Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, of a
"bolder and more candid federal AIDS prevention campaign").
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The ultimate objective should be the mandatory and uniform
testing and counseling of pregnant women. Fortunately, tort law
provides a mechanism for achieving this objective through the
broad scale adoption of such a duty: a cause of action for wrongful
life by the infant against the negligent health care provider.
Although an action for wrongful life does present problems, it is
also the most effective mechanism for the rapid and consistent imposition of a duty to test.

